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ESSAY
SPEAKING LOUDER THAN WORDS:
FINDING AN OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT
IN THE HOBBS ACT
Matthew Ladew*
Federal conspiracy law has a problem. It is sometimes easier to put
someone in prison for twenty years than it is to put her away for five—
for the very same crime. This situation stems from a bright-line rule to
which the Supreme Court has long adhered: when Congress wants an
overt act requirement, Congress will explicitly so specify. Consider the
resulting status quo. The general federal conspiracy statute requires
proof of an overt act. Its maximum sentence is five years. In contrast, the
Hobbs Act contains no overt act requirement, yet it provides for a maxi-
mum sentence of twenty years when a defendant conspires to violate the
Act. The problem becomes clear: if a defendant is charged under both
statutes for the same crime, it is easier to imprison her for twenty years
than for five. Other statutes have text that mirrors the Hobbs Act’s, ex-
panding the problem’s scope. This Essay attempts to show that the
Court’s explicit-language rule should not apply to the Hobbs Act. It dem-
onstrates that Congress codified a baseline overt act requirement in the
general conspiracy statute. Further, this Essay argues that the Hobbs
Act’s legislative history undermines the Court’s rule. It thus concludes
that the Act provides an ideal vehicle to revisit that rule.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2010, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment
against Ronald Salahuddin, former Deputy Mayor of Newark, New
Jersey.1 The government accused Salahuddin of steering city demolition
contracts to a specific contractor.2 The contractor then steered the work
to Salahuddin’s choice of subcontractor—Salahuddin’s alleged business
partner.3 The contractor, it turned out, was an FBI informant who had
turned over tapes of their conversations to the Bureau.4
The prosecution charged Salahuddin in part under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951, the Hobbs Act,5 a federal anti-racketeering statute. Its main pro-
vision is broad in scope and provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the move-
ment of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do” is guilty of a crime.6
Hobbs Act prosecutions are common. As of October 2, 2018, there
were 886 prosecutions year-to-date in which § 1951 was the lead
charge.7 This charge also appears to be an increasingly common weapon
in the prosecutor’s arsenal: the number of prosecutions in 2018 repre-
sented an almost 24 percent increase from 2017 and a 111 percent in-
crease from 1998.8 “Moreover,” as Salahuddin’s petition for a writ of
certiorari pointed out, “because these numbers track only cases where the
Hobbs Act was the ‘lead charge,’ the data undercount the actual number
1 United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 334–35 (3d Cir. 2014).
2 Id. at 335–36.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 334.
5 Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2016).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
7 See Prosecutions for 2018: Lead Charge: 18 USC 1951 - Hobbs Act, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 2, 2018), http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x205bb3a24b
5d.html. On defining the “lead charge”: “When more than one charge is involved, the most
serious or so-called lead charge is commonly used. Different data systems use different criteria
for determining which of the charges to pick as the most serious or lead charge.” About the
Data: Understanding the Terminology Which Agencies Use, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS AC-
CESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://tracfed.syr.edu/help/data/dataTerminology.html.
8 See Prosecutions for 2018, supra note 7. See also Prosecutions for September 2015: R
Lead Charge: 18 USC 1951 - Hobbs Act, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE
(Oct. 22, 2018), http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x205bce3296f8.html (tracking increases in
Hobbs Act prosecutions by month rather than by year).
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of prosecutions.”9 A related thorn is the fact that prosecutors routinely
include conspiracy charges when indicting multiple defendants.10
The Hobbs Act’s broad language has led to some surprising results.
“The majority of federal appellate court opinions in which campaign
contributions are alleged to be bribes arise not in the context of the Fed-
eral Bribery Statute, but in the context of the Hobbs Act.”11 The broad-
ness of its language and scope makes the Hobbs Act a particularly
attractive tool for prosecutors, which in turn makes it important to under-
stand the statute’s parameters.
With respect to conspiratorial liability under the Hobbs Act, the cir-
cuits are currently split over whether the Act requires the defendant to
have committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.12 In
Salahuddin’s case, this stung particularly hard: after the district court
judge refused to instruct the jury that a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires an
overt act, the jury acquitted Salahuddin on all counts—except the Hobbs
Act conspiracy charge.13 In other words, his guilt may have rested en-
tirely on conversations. Indeed, as Salahuddin’s certiorari petition ar-
gued, if the charges had “been brought in [another circuit], the
government would have been required to prove that [Salahuddin] com-
mitted an overt act.”14 This requirement may have changed the result.
The government’s opposition to certiorari in Salahuddin’s case
pointed out that only two courts have considered this issue when the
parties briefed it.15 Both of those courts found that an overt act is not a
required element.16 The courts that have acknowledged an overt act re-
quirement have merely stated so without scrutiny.17 Building on those
courts’ apparent intuition that an overt act is a necessary protection, this
Essay strives to provide the analysis that they did not. There are strong
arguments in favor of finding an overt act requirement in the Hobbs Act.
Hopefully, this Essay will open the door to extending the inquiry to other
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Salahuddin v. United States, No. 14-654 (U.S.
Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Salahuddin Petition].
10 See id.
11 Brennan T. Hughes, The Crucial “Corrupt Intent” Element in Federal Bribery Laws,
51 CAL. W. L. REV 25, 44 (2014).
12 The First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the overt act require-
ment in Hobbs Act conspiracies. See infra Section II.B. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
have embraced it. See infra Section II.C.
13 See United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2014).
14 Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 7. R
15 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, Salahuddin v. United States, No.
14-654, (U.S. Apr. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Government’s Opposition Brief] (referring to the
Third and Eleventh Circuits).
16 Id.
17 Id.
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statutes where it is very likely that a broad-based textualist rule, at least
as the Supreme Court has announced it, would lead to the wrong result.18
Indeed, it is important that the Supreme Court revisit its conspiracy
jurisprudence.19 Essentially, the Court believes that Congress will always
say explicitly when a criminal conspiracy requires an overt act; if Con-
gress does not want an overt act requirement, it simply omits that lan-
guage from the statute and lets the common law definition of conspiracy,
which requires no overt act, control.
This seemingly innocuous understanding actually produces an ab-
surd result. The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, car-
ries a potential five-year sentence and explicitly requires proof of an
overt act.20 The Hobbs Act, by contrast, can be used to put a defendant in
prison for twenty years, but it does not have overt act language.21 Notice
what this means: if a defendant is charged under both statutes, it is more
difficult to put him or her in prison for five years than for twenty.
This Essay pushes back against this bizarre state of affairs. The
Hobbs Act’s legislative history calls the Supreme Court’s bright-line,
one-size-fits-all rule into doubt. Further, although Congress has adopted
its own definition of a conspiracy in § 371, one that unambiguously re-
quires an overt act in all circumstances, courts now assume Congress is
ignoring the overt act requirements it has plainly laid out elsewhere when
it fails to use overt act language in that instance. This assumption is
strange. Either courts should require an overt act to convict for a conspir-
acy or they should not. Imagining a reason for this discrepancy among
statutes, other than an effort to make the prosecutor’s job easier in certain
arbitrary instances, is difficult.22 One standard of proof should apply any
time the government wants to convict someone of a criminal conspiracy.
To argue these points, this Essay first provides an overview of rele-
vant conspiracy law concepts. It also delves into important Supreme
Court precedent, before examining the circuit split on the Hobbs Act.
18 Whether the Hobbs Act’s “or conspires” phrasing calls for an overt act requirement is
almost certainly not limited only to that statute. Other statutes use the same “or conspires”
formulation following a substantive offense. See Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 17 R
(pointing to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1366(a), 2332, 2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1) and 50 U.S.C § 1705(a)).
Additionally, some of these statutes have already been the subject of their own circuit splits
over whether they require overt acts for conspiratorial liability. For instance, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1) penalizes “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)
(2012) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit requires an overt act here, but the Fourth Circuit
does not. See Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 18 (citing United States v. El-Mezain, 664 R
F.3d 467, 537 (5th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 140 n.30 (4th Cir.
2014)).
19 See infra discussion accompanying notes 50–64. R
20 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2016).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2016).
22 This Essay considers plausible explanations in the discussion accompanying note 140. R
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Then it makes the case for requiring an overt act as an element of Hobbs
Act conspiracies and calls on courts to reexamine more generally the
wisdom of the modern overt act regime.
I. GENERAL ISSUES IN CONSPIRACY LAW
Conspiracy law, as the Court once put it, “identifies the agreement
to engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient threat to social
order to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement
alone, plus an overt act in pursuit of it, regardless of whether the crime
agreed upon actually is committed.”23 In a sense, then, conspiracy law
seeks to address inchoate crimes before even the attempt stage.
This area of the law is a morass that has drawn judicial and schol-
arly criticism.24 Judge Learned Hand famously referred to conspiracy
law as the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”25 Many of us
are intuitively uncomfortable with the idea of “thought crimes.”
“[C]onspiracy seems to be an aberration of criminal law; without overt
acts, those prosecuted for conspiracy have neither committed the crime
that was their objective nor taken any actions towards it.”26 Two scholars
have argued that conspiracies should be protected under the First
Amendment until some action moves it “beyond the stage of pure
thought.”27
The key question is whether courts should punish the conspiratorial
agreement itself or require some overt act in furtherance of it—albeit an
overt act that falls short of a full attempt.28 Indeed, though it helps to
effectuate the goal of the conspiracy, an overt act is often “noncriminal”
23 United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (citing United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532, 542 (1947)). It is noteworthy, given the overt act language in the definition, that
Bayer was decided right after Congress passed the Hobbs Act. For a helpful survey of conspir-
acy law from that period, see generally Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959).
24 See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Prac-
tice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 967 (1977) (“Until the charge is curbed, the conspiracy doctrine will
remain the source of considerable confusion and, more troublingly, the source of at least occa-
sional injustice.”).
25 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). See generally Solomon A.
Klein, Conspiracy—The Prosecutor’s Darling, 24 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1957).
26 Martin H. Redish and Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression,
76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 704 (2013).
27 See id. at 732; see also Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech,
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 865, 917 (2013) (“[C]onspiracy law puts serious pressure on the princi-
ples of free speech.”). Even the mens rea requirements in some of these statutes have come
under attack. “The cluster of federal criminal laws that can be described as anti-bribery statutes
are alarmingly easy to violate.” Hughes, supra note 11, at 26. R
28 Although it is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth emphasizing that there is a
distinction between an attempt and an overt act. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
387–88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[C]ombination, intention and overt act may all be
present without amounting to a criminal attempt—as if all that were done should be an agree-
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and “relatively minor.”29 Although the common law did not require
proof of an overt act for conspiratorial liability to attach, the Model Penal
Code adopted the overt act requirement for conspiracies to commit
crimes other than first-degree and second-degree felonies.30 “Since Jus-
tice Harlan’s opinion in Yates v. United States,31 overt act provisions
have been supported by a dual justification: . . . assur[ing] that a credible
threat of an actual substantive crime exists, and also [guarding] against
the unwarranted indictment of innocent persons under the conspiracy ru-
bric.”32 In other words, an “evil state of mind” alone should not be pun-
ishable.33 The overt act requirement is not always present, nor is the
overt act always something that even looks criminal. But, at least under
one theory, the overt act requirement allows “the defendant to withdraw
from the agreement, after it was entered, but before any affirmative act is
done to put the agreement into effect, without incurring criminal liabil-
ity.”34 The opportunity to renounce is a key protection in avoiding the
punishment of thoughts.
States have followed the Model Penal Code’s overt act provision to
varying degrees. Some require proof of a “substantial step,” whereas
others preserve the common law’s rejection of the overt act require-
ment.35 Note, however, that only eight states fall into the latter category;
a strong majority of states require an overt act in some form.36 Some
states, such as Oregon, have not codified the overt act requirement be-
cause they believe the lax interpretation of the requirement in practice
makes it “almost meaningless.”37 New Jersey, on the other hand, views
ment to murder a man fifty miles away and the purchase of a pistol for the purpose. [To
qualify as an attempt, t]here must be dangerous proximity to success.”).
29 Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 23, at 946. R
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 503(5) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985). The com-
mentaries explain that the purpose of the overt act is that “it affords at least a minimal added
assurance, beyond the bare agreement, that a socially dangerous combination exists.” Id. at
cmt. 453. But “when the agreed-upon crime is grave enough to be classified as a felony of the
first or second degree,” it is possible to dispense with this added protection because of the
importance of “preventive intervention.” Id.
31 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Here the overt act was a speech given at
a Communist Party meeting. See id. at 333–34.
32 Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1122, 1155 (1975).
33 Id.
34 Mario Pittoni, Comment, The “Overt Act” in Conspiracy, 18 BROOK. L. REV. 263,
264 (1952). The theory is known as “locus poenitentiae.” Id.
35 See Buscemi, supra note 32, at 1153–54. R
36 See id.
37 See id. at 1157. This seems like a cop-out. Had the Oregon legislators wanted the
requirement, they surely could have crafted it so that it had teeth.
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the conspiratorial agreement itself as the overt act, effectively repealing
the requirement.38
II. THE STATE OF HOBBS ACT CONSPIRACY LAW
Federal conspiracy law, similarly, is quite messy. The trigger for an
overt act requirement is sometimes unclear.39
In 1909, when Congress codified the first general criminal conspir-
acy statute, it provided, in relevant part, that “[i]f two or more persons
conspire[d] to commit any offense against the United States, . . . and one
or more of such parties [did] any act to effect the object of the conspir-
acy, each of the parties to such conspiracy [would] be fined . . . or im-
prisoned.”40 In 1946, Congress passed the Hobbs Act. In 1948, when
Congress revised Title 18, it codified both § 371 (the general conspiracy
statute) and § 1951 (the Hobbs Act).
Section 371 adopts almost verbatim the language from the 1909
statute:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.41
Elsewhere, the Hobbs Act provides as follows:
38 See id. (citing State v. Carbone, 91 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1952)). Carbone stands for the
confusing, circular proposition that intent is not indictable, but once an agreement exists “to
carry it into effect, the very plot is an act itself.” See Carbone, 91 A.2d at 574.
39 Other scholarship on the Hobbs Act has not addressed this question. Most of it deals
with the meaning of other phrases in the statute. See, e.g., Kristal S. Stippich, Behind the
Words: Interpreting the Hobbs Act Requirement of “Obtaining of Property from Another”, 36
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 295, 295, 325 (2003) (addressing the Act’s definition of extortion and
how to interpret its use of “property”); Medrith Lee Hager, Note, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining
the Distinction between a Bribe and a Gift, 83 KY. L. J. 197, 200–02 (1994) (distinguishing
between a bribe and a gratuity); Thomas A. Secrest, Note, Bribery Equals Extortion: The
Supreme Court Refuses to Make Inducement a Necessary Element of Extortion “Under Color
of Official Right” Under the Hobbs Act, § 1951(b): Evans v. United States 112 S. Ct. 1881
(interim ed. 1992), 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 251, 251–52, 281–82 (1993) (arguing the Supreme
Court “failed to interpret the Hobbs Act correctly” by conflating bribery and extortion). This
bribery/extortion distinction is a common thread. Compare James Lindgren, The Theory, His-
tory, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695 (1993), with
Herbert J. Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnec-
essary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1971).
40 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, § 37, 35 Stat. 1096 (1909).
41 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 371, 62 Stat. 683, 701 (1948).
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Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or af-
fects commerce or the movement of any article or com-
modity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this sec-
tion shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.42
Thus, this is the timeline: First, in 1909, Congress establishes a gen-
eral conspiracy offense that requires an overt act in no uncertain terms
and with no exceptions.43 Second, in 1946, it passes the Hobbs Act.44
Third, two years later, it reaffirms its commitment to an overt act in codi-
fying § 371 without meaningfully modifying the 1909 statute.45
What to make of the fact that the Hobbs Act does not contain overt
act language? Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether the Act requires proof of an overt act, several circuit courts
have. In order to understand the decisions of the courts of appeals, it is
first necessary to review some of the Supreme Court cases that guided
them.
A. Supreme Court Overt Act Precedent
The Court has sent conflicting messages on conspiracy law. On the
one hand, it has made special note of the potential for abuse when it
comes to conspiracy charges. In Grunewald v. United States,46 for exam-
ple, the Court recalled cases in which it “repeatedly warned that [it] will
view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-
sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.”47 Justice Jackson, at one
point, referred to conspiracy law as “elastic, sprawling and pervasive.”48
Further, four decades ago, the Court gave some credence to the idea of
an overt act being a general element of a conspiracy.49
But on the other hand, some significant cases have limited protec-
tions like the overt act requirement. In United States v. Shabani,50 the
42 18 USC § 1951(a) (emphasis added).
43 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, supra note 40. R
44 62 Stat. at 420.
45 See Act of June 25, 1948, supra note 41. R
46 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
47 Id. at 404 (citing Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946)).
48 Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445 (Jackson, J., concurring).
49 See supra discussion accompanying note 23 (noting that the Court defined conspiracy R
as a criminal agreement “plus an overt act in pursuit of it”).
50 United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
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Court dismissed as dictum “whatever exasperation” it had expressed in
Grunewald toward conspiracy prosecutions.51 In Shabani, the defendant
was a supplier in a drug distribution scheme and was charged with con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846,52 the federal drug
conspiracy statute.53 The Court noted that neither the original statute nor
its amendment mentioned an overt act requirement, and it refused to read
one into it.54 In a manner reminiscent of some state courts,55 the Court
noted that the “prohibition against criminal conspiracy . . . does not pun-
ish mere thought; the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus.”56
More recently, the Court confronted a similar question in Whitfield
v. United States.57 There the defendants were executives of an entity
known as Greater Ministries International Church.58 Greater Ministries
swindled its investors by taking their money and not making promised
investments; as a result, the defendants “together allegedly received more
than $1.2 million in commissions.”59 The government charged them
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h),60 the conspiracy provision of the federal
money laundering statute, and the district court denied their request for
an overt act instruction.61 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on the
Court’s decision in Shabani.62 The Supreme Court, in affirming the Elev-
enth Circuit, noted that the original statute did not itself contain any con-
spiracy provisions. The government would thus rely on the general
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, under which it may charge a defen-
dant for conspiring to commit any offense against the United States.63
Congress specifically changed § 1956 in 1992, before Shabani and Whit-
field were decided, and inserted a provision with language that closely
mirrored the statute at issue in Shabani.64 The Court interpreted Con-
gress’s move to mean no overt act was necessary.65
51 See id. at 14.
52 “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this sub-
chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commis-
sion of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”
53 See Shabani, 513 U.S. at 11.
54 See id. at 13.
55 See, e.g., supra note 38. R
56 Shabani, 513 U.S. at 16.
57 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005).
58 Id. at 211.
59 Id.
60 “Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section
1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission
of which was the object of the conspiracy.”
61 Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 211.
62 See Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 212 (citing United States v. Hall, 349 F.3d 1320, 1323–24
(11th Cir. 2003)).
63 Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 213. See also Act of June 25, 1948, supra note 41. R
64 See Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 213.
65 See id. at 214.
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The question is how this fits into the context of the Hobbs Act.
Neither Shabani nor Whitfield dealt with that statute or its exact word-
ing.66 Nevertheless, the cases have proven very influential in some of the
circuits that faced this question.
B. Circuits That Have Held There is No Overt Act Requirement in
the Hobbs Act
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the Hobbs Act’s lack of overt act lan-
guage, some courts have found that Shabani and Whitfield should control
the outcome here. Only two circuits, the Third and the Eleventh, have
dealt with the issue when the parties briefed it, and they both came out
the same way: an overt act is not a requirement of a Hobbs Act conspir-
acy. The more recent decision is the Third Circuit’s opinion in Salahud-
din. That case was a matter of first impression for the circuit,67 and the
court held unequivocally that a “Hobbs Act conspiracy under § 1951
does not require an overt act.”68 In so holding, the court relied on
Shabani and Whitfield. With respect to the latter, it noted that “[it] is only
the last in a line of Supreme Court decisions applying the principle that
when a conspiracy statute is silent as to whether an overt act is required,
there is no such requirement.”69 The government obviously argued for
that result.70 It is worth noting, however, that the government has not
always assumed that under the Hobbs Act no overt act is required. In-
deed, the Third Circuit remarked in a different case, adjudicated just a
few years prior and well after Shabani and Whitfield, that the government
argued “that the [Hobbs Act] conspiracy count is valid because both ele-
ments of a conspiracy are met: (1) criminal intent and (2) an overt act.”71
The Eleventh Circuit also dealt with this specific issue as a matter of
first impression. In United States v. Pistone,72 the defendant discussed
plans with his co-workers to rob an armored car, but “[n]o overt act was
listed in the indictment and none was presented at trial.”73 The court put
it bluntly after acknowledging the existence of a circuit split: “We follow
the First and Second Circuits: no overt act must be alleged and
66 See infra Section III.A.
67 Salahuddin, 765 F.3d at 337.
68 Id. at 338.
69 Id.
70 See Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 10 n.3. R
71 United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Kale, 2010 WL 1718291, *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that the “Government
asserts that proof of a Hobbs Act conspiracy also requires proof of an overt act”).
72 United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999).
73 Id. at 959.
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proved.”74 In so deciding, the court found both the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Shabani and the “plain language” of the statute instructive.75
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, the First and Second Circuits have
indeed rejected the overt act requirement. Neither has done so, however,
based on a briefing of the issue. In a recent First Circuit case, the defen-
dant was convicted of planning an armed robbery of some armored
trucks in Puerto Rico.76 He argued, among other things, that “the district
court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it needed to determine that
[he] agreed to commit the overt act mentioned in Count One of the in-
dictment.”77 The court rejected this argument out of hand: “Evidence of
an overt act is not required to establish a Hobbs Act conspiracy.”78
This out-of-hand treatment also appeared in the Second Circuit. In
United States v. Clemente,79 the defendants worked in the New York
City Department of Buildings and “regularly demanded payoffs” for the
issuance of certain certificates and the assurance that paperwork would
not get lost.80 They argued on appeal that the government failed to prove
any actual racketeering actions.81 The court did not care: “While a Hobbs
Act substantive offense requires proof of (1) interference with commerce
and (2) extortion, . . . a Hobbs Act conspiracy charge does not carry
those same requirements. In order to establish a Hobbs Act conspiracy,
the government does not have to prove any overt act.”82 These circuits
did not explain their reasoning, as is also true of those courts that have
found an overt act requirement.83
74 Id. at 960.
75 See id. For a recent, compelling, and relevant attack on the plain meaning rule, see
William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
539, 546 (2017) (“Upon closer examination, there is something puzzling about the plain mean-
ing rule. There are reasons to consider all pertinent information. There are reasons to categori-
cally discard certain kinds of pertinent information. But why consider it only sometimes?”).
76 See United States v. Monserrate-Valentı´n, 729 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2013).
77 Id. at 62.
78 Id. at 46 (citing United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir. 2000)). Interest-
ingly, this position has its roots in the Fifth Circuit’s tacitly overruled decision in Ladner v.
United States, 168 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1948), discussed infra note 95. See United States v. R
Tormos-Vega, 959 F.2d 1103, 1115 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Ladner for the proposition that
“§ 1951 does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy”).
79 United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994).
80 Id. at 478–79.
81 Id. at 480.
82 Id. See also United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 983 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1987)) (comparing the Hobbs Act
to § 371 and noting that the “government need not prove an overt act in order to establish a
Hobbs Act conspiracy”). The trust in Persico may be misplaced. The overt act discussion in
that case dealt with the RICO Act, not the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act has its own complexities
as an anti-racketeering statute, and it is not obvious why the court’s reasoning on RICO con-
spiracies necessarily applies to the Hobbs Act.
83 Fourth Circuit dictum indicates it agrees with these circuits. See United States v.
Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 409 n.12 (4th Cir. 2014), a’ffd, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016) (“Although the
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C. Circuits That Have Found the Overt Act is an Element of a
Hobbs Act Conspiracy
The Fifth Circuit has displayed the strongest fidelity to an overt act
requirement in the Hobbs Act. In United States v. Stephens,84 the indict-
ment charged that the defendant, a bail bondsman and town alderman,
conspired with members of the “police department to extort money from
travelers passing through the town, in exchange for the dismissal or re-
duction of driving while intoxicated . . . charges, the return of the trav-
elers’ driver’s licenses and the release of their vehicles from
impoundment, and obtaining bond without being jailed.”85 He challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his Hobbs Act conspiracy con-
viction, arguing specifically that “he was not a part of [the conspiracy]
and had no knowledge of it.”86 The court framed the rule thus: “To con-
vict for criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the jury must find
an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime, and an
overt act by one of the conspirators to further the conspiracy.”87
The Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed this holding in two follow-up cases.
United States v. Box88 was another bail bondsman case. The scheme
there was “designed to extort money (through bonds and fines) from
travelers arrested at a roadside park in exchange for promises that the
charges, usually public lewdness or indecent exposure, would be dropped
or reduced.”89 To resolve the case, the court quoted the exact rule from
Stephens.90 United States v. Hickman91 involved a series of eight armed
robberies of local restaurants and stores.92 Several defendants challenged
their Hobbs Act conspiracy convictions on sufficiency-of-the-evidence
grounds. The court cited the same rule from Stephens in affirming the
convictions.93 Both of these cases were decided after Shabani, and their
clear commitment to the Stephens rule is noteworthy, especially given
elements of [the] offenses are similar, a § 371 conspiracy requires proof of an overt act, while
a § 1951 conspiracy does not.”). Oddly enough, in affirming Ocasio, the Supreme Court may
have cast doubt on this claim. See infra discussion accompanying notes 175–178. R
84 United States v. Stephens, 964 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1992).
85 Id. at 426.
86 Id. at 427–28.
87 Id. at 427. Then, using a “totality of the circumstances” approach, the court found “a
common plan and purpose” and affirmed Stephens’s conviction. Id. at 428.
88 United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995).
89 Id. at 348.
90 See id. at 349 (quoting Stephens, 964 F.2d at 427).
91 United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 179
F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
92 See id. at 450–52.
93 See id. at 454 (citing Stephens, 964 F.2d at 427).
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the opposite result from the Third and Eleventh Circuits following that
case. Even after Whitfield, the court held to the Stephens rule.94
There is one wrinkle in the Fifth Circuit story. The circuit first dealt
with this issue in 1948 in Ladner v. United States95—and it came out the
other way. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that “[the Hobbs Act] . . .
does not require an overt act to complete the offense, although the exis-
tence of the conspiracy may be inferred from the commission in concert
of overt acts by the defendants.”96 The Government’s Opposition brief in
the Salahuddin case argued that the Fifth Circuit will follow Ladner if
the discrepancy is ever brought to its attention. This argument was based
on a prior statement from the court: “Our rule in this circuit is that where
holdings in two of our opinions are in conflict, the earlier opinion con-
trols and constitutes the binding precedent in the circuit.”97 Perhaps the
government is correct, but that seems like wishful thinking. There are not
“two opinions” conflicting here; there are at least four newer opinions
that conflict with Ladner, all of which had the opportunity to evaluate
Ladner’s statement. The circuit has made its preference for an overt act
requirement quite clear, even if it has not provided much of a rationale
for that preference.
Two other circuits also require an overt act to prove a Hobbs Act
conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit heard a case in which the two defendants
were a commissioner of roads and a director of public works in Shelby
County, Tennessee.98 They used their official positions “to obtain money
and other things of value from persons in Shelby County in exchange for
their actions in advancing priorities for the construction and appropria-
tion of monies for certain road projects in the County.”99 The court made
special mention of the fact that the “indictment [ ] set forth 42 overt acts
committed separately and/or in combination by [defendants] in further-
ance of the alleged conspiracy.”100 Evaluating the Hobbs Act conspiracy,
the court had this to say: “In showing the existence of a conspiracy, two
elements must be proven: an agreement between two or more persons to
94 See generally United States v. Herrera, 466 F. App’x. 409 (5th Cir. 2012). The defend-
ants were associated with the Barrio Azteco prison gang, whose “primary criminal activity
involved the extortion of payments . . . from narcotics traffickers” that sold drugs in Barrio
Azteco territory. Id. at 413. Two of them challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of their
Hobbs Act conspiracy convictions. Id. at 417. The court again quoted the Stephens formulation
of the rule. See id. District courts also hold to the requirement post-Whitfield. See, e.g., United
States v. Enriquez, 2009 WL 522722, at *3 (W.D. Tex.) (quoting the Stephens rule). It is
important to note that no court since Stephens has even tried to trim the “overt act” language
from its rule.
95 Ladner v. United States, 168 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1948).
96 Id. at 773.
97 Boyd v. Puckett, 905 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1990).
98 See United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 413 (6th Cir. 1980).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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act together in committing an offense, and an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy.”101 More dramatically, the circuit heard a case in which
the defendant was charged under both the Hobbs Act and under the drug
conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846.102 The court stated its position with
little explanation but with remarkable clarity: “[C]onspiracy to violate 21
U.S.C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act, while conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1951 does require proof of an overt act.”103 This has
strong implications. Note that although this was decided before Shabani,
the Shabani Court agreed that § 846 does not require an overt act. Thus,
there is reason to think that there is something different about the Hobbs
Act, at least in this circuit, and that the difference is worth investigating.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that it approves of the
overt act requirement in Hobbs Act conspiracies. In United States v.
Tuchow,104 the defendants appealed on “sufficiency-of-the-evidence
grounds and the court of appeals, in reviewing their claims, stated that
the government must prove an overt act to establish conspiracy to com-
mit extortion under the Hobbs Act.”105 Specifically, the court said that
“to establish a conspiracy, the government must prove that there was an
agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, that
the defendant was a party to the agreement, and that an overt act was
committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the coconspira-
tors.”106 The court did not delve into the details, but note that the federal
statutory elements of conspiracy, enshrined in § 371,107 operate in the
background here.108 That is the realm to which this Essay now turns.
III. FINDING AN OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT IN THE HOBBS ACT
Many commentators have argued for a stronger overt act require-
ment in general, one that moves us farther away from simply punishing
the agreement.109 Their argument has merit. Before getting there, how-
101 Id. at 414 (quoting United States v. Williams, 503 F.2d 50, 54 (6th Cir. 1974)). See
also United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1979) (calling attention to
the “32 overt acts” set forth in the indictment before quoting the Williams conspiracy rule).
102 See United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1458–59 (6th Cir. 1988).
103 Id. at 1465.
104 United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
105 Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 9 (citing Tuchow, 768 F.2d at 869). R
106 Tuchow, 768 F.2d at 869. See also United States v. Stodola, 953 F.2d 266, 272 (7th
Cir. 1992) (quoting the overt act rule from Tuchow).
107 See 19 U.S.C. § 371 (2016).
108 But see United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 810 n.† (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that
“some of our decisions list an overt act as an element, without discussion of the issue”) (em-
phasis added).
109 There are many examples, though none of the commentators has focused on the prob-
lem of getting courts to recognize the requirement. Writing on the relatively new “fantasy
defense” in criminal law—whereby a defendant argues that “his expression represented not
conspiracy agreement, but fantasy role play”—Kaitlin Ek argues that weak overt act require-
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ever, it is crucial to confront the tactical reality that courts must recog-
nize the overt act requirement in a given statute. Thus, this Essay’s
purpose is to show that courts should require any kind of overt act, how-
ever strong, in Hobbs Act conspiracy cases.
Despite the fact that the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have not
explained why an overt act should be an element of a Hobbs Act conspir-
acy, it almost certainly is. This Part endeavors to provide the missing
explanation. It first concedes that, based on Supreme Court precedent,
textualist arguments are unfavorable. But it then demonstrates why a tex-
tualist reading alone is incomplete: such a reading produces the absurd
result of the same crime requiring a lower standard of proof yet carrying
a harsher punishment,110 and it overlooks illuminating and important leg-
islative history.
A. The Statutory Text
Textualism, at least as the Supreme Court has applied it, produces
the wrong result when interpreting the Act. While we might intuit that
the statutory language “or conspires,” connects in some way to the fed-
eral understanding of conspiracy outlined in § 371,111 the Court has re-
jected this connection. Unfortunately, that rejection has had bizarre
ments pose a particularly acute danger to those who invoke the defense. See Kaitlin Ek, Note,
Conspiracy and the Fantasy Defense: The Strange Case of the Cannibal Cop, 64 DUKE L.J.
901, 901, 937 (2015). Ek argues forcefully for a strengthening of the requirements, specifically
advocating for a reformulation of the overt act requirement that “include[s] the requirement
that an overt act must independently make it more likely that the defendant actually intended
an unlawful goal; an overt act should not be equally consistent with guilt or innocence.” See id.
at 942–45. Other scholarship has argued that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on overt acts
is wrong. Kevin Jon Heller contends that Shabani was incorrectly decided: “Shabani’s elimi-
nation of the overt act requirement [in drug conspiracies] not only encourages the government
to bring drug conspiracy cases to trial with evidence that cannot possibly prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it also insulates convictions obtained in such cases from
meaningful appellate review.” Kevin Jon Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt? Of Drug Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 111, 142 (1996). But see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 223–25
(2000) (advocating for the value of overt act requirements in conspiracy law but also noting
that “[m]aking the overt act part of the offense implied, to the government’s advantage, that
venue could be laid in any jurisdiction in which an act was committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and each additional act set the statute of limitations running anew”).
110 Note that this Essay does not invoke the traditional understanding of the absurd results
canon. That canon is an exception to the plain meaning principle. It allows courts to deviate
from the text of the statute if its application would lead to an absurd result. See Veronica M.
Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in
Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 127–28 (1994). This Essay’s claim is that the
absence of certain language in the Hobbs Act does not make its meaning plain.
111 The Salahuddin Petition makes a stronger, if perhaps overstated, version of this argu-
ment. It says that “[t]he most logical interpretation of Section 1951(a)’s two-word reference to
a conspiracy offense is that Congress intended to incorporate then-existing requirements of the
general federal conspiracy standard, including proof of an overt act.” Salahuddin Petition,
supra note 9, at 11. R
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consequences for federal conspiracy law. This Section examines those
consequences.
In assessing the connection to § 371 claim, recall the timeline laid
out above.112 As the Salahuddin Petition argued, “The terms of that more
specific statute [ ] elucidate Congress’s intent with respect to the Hobbs
Act’s conspiracy clause.”113 Indeed, the Supreme Court deployed this
related-statutes canon in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,114
noting that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifi-
cally to the topic at hand.”115 It seems reasonable to assume that Con-
gress’s intent was to incorporate what it had already determined to be an
element of any general conspiracy—and what it reaffirmed after passing
the Hobbs Act.
The Salahuddin Petition agreed: “If Congress wished to depart from
the general requirements of a federal conspiracy offense when it enacted
the Hobbs Act, it could, and would, have said so.”116 The Court itself has
noted that “it can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically
address language on the statute books that it wishes to change.”117 The
use of the phrase “or conspires,” particularly in the context of the legisla-
tive history recounted below, does not at all indicate that Congress in-
tended to waive the overt act requirement that had been around for
almost forty years.118 Additionally, the language of § 371 contains no
carve-outs for first-degree or second-degree felonies, such as the one in
the Model Penal Code,119 and Congress has never added any such excep-
tions. Proof of an overt act is a blanket requirement for any conviction
under the section.
But again, the elephant in the room is the problem of squaring all
this with Supreme Court precedent. The Court assumes that, without a
specifically delineated overt act requirement, the common law controls—
meaning no overt act is required. In Shabani, the Court explained, “[w]e
have consistently held that the common law understanding of conspiracy
does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a
112 See supra discussion accompanying notes 40–44. R
113 Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 11. R
114 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
115 Id. at 133 (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–31 (1998);
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
116 Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 12. R
117 Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453.
118 See also Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 12 (“Congress’s use of the short phrase R
‘or conspires’ provides no basis for altering the generally-applicable requirements of a federal
conspiracy conviction.”). It is true that the Court had already interpreted the Sherman Act to be
an exception here. See infra discussion accompanying notes 127–28. R
119 See note 30. R
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condition of liability.”120 Further, as discussed in note 160, the Court
based its holding on the notion that it is a “settled principle of statutory
construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt
the common law definition of statutory terms.”121
In Whitfield, the Court observed that Congress was on notice of its
method of interpretation as announced in Shabani.122 But that obviously
cannot be true of the Hobbs Act, which was passed forty-eight years
prior to Shabani. The Court addressed this objection with respect to the
statute in question in Whitfield: “While Shabani was decided two years
after § 1965(h) was enacted, the rule it articulated was established de-
cades earlier in Nash and Singer.”123 The Court was referring to Nash v.
United States and Singer v. United States,124 two cases that were each
decided before Congress passed the Hobbs Act. They are therefore worth
examining.
Nash probably does not dictate the result here. In that case, the
Court held that “the Sherman Act punishes the conspiracies at which it is
aimed on the common law footing—that is to say, it does not make the
doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liabil-
ity.”125 Later, in Shabani, the Court put it thus: “[B]y choosing a text
modeled on § 371, [Congress] gets an overt-act requirement; by choos-
ing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, it dispenses with
such a requirement.”126 The latter is not the case here. The Hobbs Act
was enacted in part to shore up the Sherman Act’s shortcomings as an
antiracketeering statute.127 The evidence suggests that the way in which
Congress attempted to respond to the shortcomings of the Sherman Act
was via the substantive offenses of the Hobbs Act, not the granting of
unbounded power to prosecutors. Congress’s rejecting the Sherman Act
120 United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994) (quoting Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)).
121 Shabani, 513 U.S. at 13.
122 See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (noting that “Congress is
presumed to have knowledge of the governing rule described in Shabani”). The Court also
used the presumed knowledge of Shabani to reject use of “vague” legislative history. See id. at
216–17. Again, the drafters of the Hobbs Act could not have had knowledge of Shabani.
123 Id. at 216.
124 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338
(1945).
125 Nash, 229 U.S. at 378. The Court continued: “[W]e can see no reason for reading into
the Sherman Act more than we find there.” Id.
126 United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14 (quoting United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d
283, 284 (7th Cir. 1992)) (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 See S. REP. NO. 73-532, at 1 (1934) (quoting a Department of Justice memorandum
describing the problems with using the Sherman Act to prosecute racketeers). See also H.R.
REP. NO. 73-1833, at 2 (1934) (reproducing a letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings
that said, in part, “The Sherman Antitrust Act is too restricted in its terms and the penalites
[sic] thereunder are too moderate to make that act an effective weapon in prosecuting
racketeers.”).
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in this instance should make us doubt that the Hobbs Act’s drafters used
it as a template. Instead, § 1951(a) creates a conspiracy offense “through
the inclusion of a two-word phrase (‘or conspires’) in the sentence that
establishes the substantive offense.”128
Singer is more difficult. There the Court engaged in a rigorous
grammatical analysis of the Selective Training and Service Act before
concluding that a conspiracy to violate that Act does not require an overt
act.129 The conspiracy clause in question was very similar to the one in
the Hobbs Act—“or conspire so to do”—except it followed a list of
seven separate substantive offenses.130 The Government’s Opposition
Brief argued that Salahuddin “offer[ed] no reason why the Hobbs Act—
which uses the same sentence structure—should be interpreted in a fun-
damentally different way.”131 Salahuddin weakly responded that the stat-
ute in Singer, unlike the Hobbs Act, was already largely about joint or
concerted action.132 The statute in Singer specified seven different, sub-
stantive offenses, some of which dealt with joint action, and it would
have been more reasonable to expect Congress to include references to
overt acts as it detailed these offenses.133 The “or conspire” provision is
merely a “catch-all.”134 The Hobbs Act, Salahuddin further argued, has
no concerted actions inherent in its substantive offenses; the “or con-
spires” language creates an entirely new substantive offense on its
own.135 That might be right, but it seems to be reaching. The Court has
almost certainly spoken on the textual issue at hand.136
This precedent proves to be extremely problematic. It suggests that
Congress intended to punish the mere agreement in only certain in-
stances. Perhaps that is so, but the final result is illogical. Under this
regime, a prosecutor can bring a general conspiracy charge against some-
one for a maximum sentence of five years, and in so doing, the prosecu-
128 Salahuddin Petition, supra note 9, at 13–14 (emphasis added). R
129 See Singer, 323 U.S. at 341.
130 Id. at 340.
131 Government’s Opposition Brief, supra note 15, at 13. R
132 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 5–6, Salahuddin v. United States, No. 14-654
(U.S. Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Salahuddin Reply Brief].
133 Id.
134 Id. at 5.
135 Id. at 6.
136 There is one other unique piece to the Hobbs Act textual puzzle. Following the “or
conspires” language, the statute specifically targets a perpetrator who “commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section.” This looks like an overt act requirement, at least for violence or
threats of violence. Of course, it is possible that Congress intended to require overt acts only in
cases of violence. That seems bizarre. Why would violence beget a higher standard of proof
than any other act in furtherance of a Hobbs Act conspiracy? More likely, given the Act’s
labor-violence roots (discussed infra Section III.B), is that Congress wanted to call attention to
this specific facet of what the statute penalizes.
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tor must prove an overt act. But for a subset of crimes, ones that carry
substantially harsher penalties, the common law definition suddenly
again applies, and the prosecutor needs to prove only the existence of an
agreement. To reiterate the problem in its starkest terms, someone could
even be charged both under § 371 and the Hobbs Act—and it would be
easier for the prosecutor to win on the latter, despite its harsher penalty.
This makes little sense.
In spite of this damning flaw, the Whitfield court in peculiar dictum
observed that “[m]ere use of the word ‘conspires’ surely is not enough to
establish the necessary link between these two separate statutes.”137
When drafting the Hobbs Act, however, Congress did not know about
the Shabani/Whitfield aversion to connecting § 371 with other statutes.
Salahuddin pointed out that the petitioners in Whitfield were arguing that
the statute in that case did not establish a separate conspiracy offense and
that it provided only enhanced penalties for a conviction under § 371.138
The Court rejected this “idiosyncratic claim” because if Congress had
intended this result, it would have been much clearer about the cross-
reference to § 371.139 Fair enough now that the Court has asked for this
twice. But what else could Congress have done to make the connection
clearer back in 1948 as it was codifying both § 371 and § 1951? Would
Congress even have fathomed the absurd result that this distinction
would produce?
Perhaps the response is that Congress did intend this result. It may
be difficult to catch crafty kingpins in racketeering schemes. Consider a
case like Salahuddin’s. If Salahuddin were simply directing someone else
to steer demolition contracts, let us assume, arguendo, that he did no act
beyond having conversations. It may seem sensible, then, to make it eas-
ier to prosecute the mere agreement.140 Yet notice that this is perverse:
the head of the conspiracy is punishable under § 371 without committing
an overt act, while the underlings, who did commit such an act, can be
prosecuted under the Hobbs Act and § 371. The kingpin potentially gets
twenty years, the foot soldier twenty-five. That is disquieting. Of course,
prosecutorial and sentencing discretion can assuage some of these fears,
but that does not provide a stable, consistent solution to the very real
problem with the state of the law itself. Further, the idea that Congress
was singularly focused on taking down kingpins is unmoored from the
legislative history.
137 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 215.
138 Salahuddin Reply Brief, supra note 132, at 6. R
139 See id. at 6–7 (quoting Whitfield, 543 U.S. at 215).
140 But one might take this too far and argue that neither the Hobbs Act nor § 371 should
require an overt act. As discussed above, many have argued that the overt act is an important
protection against government power.
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Salahuddin could not or did not make these arguments, and in any
event the Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition.141 This Essay
strives to produce a happier ending. The legislative history demonstrates
that Congress did not intend for these results. And when a plain reading
of a statute produces such oddities, even Justice Scalia suggested that
legislative history may be helpful: “I think it entirely appropriate to con-
sult . . . the legislative history . . . to verify that what seems to us an
unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of.”142 The next Sec-
tion examines what Congress did (and did not) do as it worked to pass
and codify the Hobbs Act.
B. The Legislative History
Textualist arguments alone obscure the fact that a Hobbs Act con-
spiracy should require proof of an overt act. But the legislative record
suggests that textualist arguments alone should not control the outcome.
Shabani and Whitfield fail to capture the nuances of the Hobbs Act,
whose history raises plausible doubts about the applicability of their “no
overt act language, no overt act requirement” rule. In the case of the
Hobbs Act, the word “conspires” should still invoke the federal defini-
tion of conspiracy, as originally defined in the 1909 statute and reaf-
firmed in § 371.
The Hobbs Act came into being due to outrage over the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Local 807 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters.143 Union members had been stopping out-of-state trucks
entering New York City and demanding “that the drivers pay regular
union-fees and permit union-members to drive and unload the trucks.”144
The Court affirmed the reversal of the union members’ convictions be-
cause of an exception in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.145 That stat-
ute provided for criminal liability for a defendant “who, in connection
with or in relation to any act affecting trade or commerce . . . [o]btain[ed]
or attempt[ed] to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use
force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable
considerations.”146 It contained an important exemption, however, for
payments “of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide em-
141 See United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2309.
142 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
143 United States v. Local 807 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521
(1942).
144 John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act
and Other Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 383–84 (2001) (citing Local
807, 315 U.S. at 526).
145 See id. at 384 (citing Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979
(1934)).
146 48 Stat. at 979–80.
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ployee.”147 Concluding “that Congress intended to exempt militant labor-
activity from the statute’s reach, the Court held that an ‘outsider who
“attempts” unsuccessfully by violent means to achieve the status of an
employee and to secure wages for services falls within the excep-
tion.’”148 This strange move outraged members of Congress, who passed
the Hobbs Act after a failed attempt to amend the Anti-Racketeering Act
of 1934.149
Remarking on “the amazing decision of the Supreme Court,” Repre-
sentative Clarence Hancock had this to say:
Of course, it was never the intent of Congress to legiti-
mize crime; nevertheless, the decision of the Supreme
Court in the teamsters’ case will be the supreme law of
the land . . . until Congress acts to correct and supersede
the decision and adopts a new law written in clear and
unmistakable language. That is all this bill does.150
Importantly for this Essay’s purposes, if it is the case that the Hobbs Act
was attempting to fix a loophole for labor unions, there is no reason to
think there is anything particularly special about the Act’s implicit con-
nection to § 371.
In their quest to shore up the union-violence oversight, the drafters
of the Hobbs Act adopted language from a New York statute.151 In 1909,
New York Penal Law § 850 defined extortion as “the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force
or fear, under color of official right.”152 Elsewhere, the New York Penal
Code made its overt act requirement for conspiracies clear: “No agree-
ment except to commit a felony upon the person of another, or to commit
arson or burglary, amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act beside such
agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the
parties to such agreement.”153
A question arises: How much should courts make of Congress’s in-
corporating New York penal law? The Congressional Record contains
this exchange:
147 48 Stat. at 980. Section 6 of the statute also told courts not to “apply any of the
provisions of this Act in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights
of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such
rights are expressed in existing statutes of the United States.” Id.
148 Gawey, supra note 144, at 384 (quoting Local 807, 315 U.S. at 531). R
149 See id. at 384.
150 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945) (emphasis added).
151 See Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 403 (2003)
(“Congress used two sources of law as models in formulating the Hobbs Act: the Penal Code
of New York and the Field Code, a 19th-century model penal code.”).
152 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850 (1909).
153 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 583 (1909).
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Mr. EBERHARTER.  Will the gentleman state for the
record, please, whether or not this bill would change the
present statutes insofar as they define robbery and extor-
tion or conspiracy to commit either of those crimes?
Mr. HANCOCK.  The bill contains definitions of rob-
bery and extortion which follow the definitions con-
tained in the laws of the State of New York. It would
change no state statutes . . . .154
Hancock, unfortunately, was not more explicit on the definition of “con-
spiracy.” Still, his answer appears to indicate that Congress intended
New York law to be the definitional framework for at least parts of the
Act. One possibility is that Hancock’s answer was incomplete and that
Congress intended to adopt New York’s definition of conspiracy. More
plausible is that Congress intended to retain its own understanding of
conspiracy—the one enshrined in § 371. But either way, New York had
updated its penal laws in 1909, the same year Congress had done so, and
both at that time explicitly delineated an overt act requirement.155 If Con-
gress were abandoning the requirement, there should be something in the
record to support that proposition—yet nothing is there.
The Judiciary Committee report on the update to the codification
provides some important additional insights. In the notes on § 371, the
Report says, “A number of special conspiracy provisions, relating to spe-
cific offenses, which were contained in various sections incorporated in
this title, were omitted because adequately covered by this section.”156 In
other words, Congress wanted § 371 to cover conspiracies to violate cer-
tain other sections of the Code—that is, it used § 371 as its baseline.
So how did Congress decide when it was worth retaining indepen-
dent conspiracy language in certain separate statutes? The Report has the
answer: “A few exceptions were made, (1) where the conspiracy would
constitute the only offense, or (2) where the punishment provided in this
section would not be commensurate with the gravity of the offense.”157
154 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945).
155 See supra discussion accompanying note 119. Congress’s statute was even stronger on R
the overt act requirement—it contained no exceptions to the requirement at all, unlike New
York’s exceptions for things like arson or burglary.
156 H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A29 (1947).
157 Id. The report continues: “Special conspiracy provisions were retained in sections 241,
286, 372, 757, 794, 956, 1201, 2271, 2384 and 2388 of this title. Special conspiracy provisions
were added to sections 2153 and 2154 of this title.” Id. Sections 241, 286, 372, 956, 2271, and
2384 are standalone conspiracy crimes. Sections 757, 794, 1201, 2388 are separate crimes with
conspiracy subsections. See the relevant sections of Title 18 of the United States Code. This
list is not exhaustive; section 1951, the Hobbs Act, does not appear. With respect to sections
2153 and 2154, the report notes that the “punishment provisions of the general conspiracy
statute, section 371 of this title, are inadequate.” H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A137. Both sec-
tions, however, still carry overt act requirements. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2153, 2154 (2016).
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In the case of the Hobbs Act, exception (1) does not apply; the Act out-
lines its own major substantive offense and uses “or conspires” language
to capture a conspiracy to violate it. Thus, Congress must have felt a
Hobbs Act violation was serious enough to warrant an extended sen-
tence. This makes sense: § 371 carries a maximum prison sentence of
five years, while § 1951 carries a maximum of twenty.158 It is crucial to
note that neither exception implies anything about the elemental require-
ments of § 371, including the overt act, being changed.
The report also discusses specific changes with respect to the Hobbs
Act language that left us with “or conspires”:
The words “attempts or conspires so to do” were substi-
tuted for sections 3 and 4 of the 1946 act, omitting as
unnecessary the words “participates in an attempt” and
the words “or acts in concert with another or with
others”, in view of section 2 of this title which makes
any person who participates in an unlawful enterprise or
aids or assists the principal offender, or does anything
towards the accomplishment of the crime, a principal
himself.159
Perhaps it is not clear what constitutes participation “in an unlawful en-
terprise,” though one might reasonably think it implies some kind of ac-
tion. But the catch-all language—doing something “towards the
accomplishment of the crime”—seems to correspond to the modified
conspiracy language. Indeed, the committee appears to have believed
that some kind of criminal deed, however small, was required to bring
the actor under the auspices of the Act. In addition, there is a reasonable
argument to be made, at least based on its findings here, that the commit-
tee’s concern in drafting the “or conspires” language was concision. If
that is the case, it is unsurprising that it did not tack on any clunky lan-
guage specifying an overt act requirement.
Perhaps most notable is the fact that nowhere in the report does it
suggest that failing to mention an overt act requirement means one does
not exist. It is true that the Court has looked at it the other way and that,
in the absence of other indications, will assume that Congress intended to
adopt the common law definition of terms.160 But it is not clear that is
158 See supra notes 20–21. R
159 H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A131. Section 2 is the operative language of the original
Hobbs Act. See Pub. L. No. 79-486, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (“Whoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in com-
merce, by robbery or extortion, shall be guilty of a felony.”).
160 See Shabani, 513 U.S. at 13 (noting that it is a “settled principle of statutory construc-
tion that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of
statutory terms”).
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what Congress intended here. Congress specifically laid out its definition
of conspiracies in § 371 and took care to examine each conspiracy
against that backdrop, evaluating whether § 371’s punishments were se-
vere enough. Where that was the case, Congress omitted separate men-
tion of conspiracy under the theory that § 371 captured it.161 Elsewhere,
in fact, Congress omitted conspiracy language altogether in part because
it was not consistent with § 371’s overt act requirement.162 Repeatedly
Congress has shown its consideration of § 371 as the starting point, the
minimum standard.
There is more. The report’s section on 18 U.S.C. § 493, which deals
with counterfeit financial instruments, has this interesting insight into the
committee’s thoughts on overt acts: “There is no sound reason for differ-
entiating between types of credit, insurance, banking and lending agen-
cies in the punishment of conspiracy or in the requirement as to proof of
overt acts.”163 Even more important for present purposes, however, is the
sentence that follows: “Since conspiracies involving offenses equally se-
rious such as obstruction of justice, bribery, embezzlements, counterfeit-
ing and false statements and offenses against the Treasury of the United
States as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation are punishable under the general con-
spiracy statute, the same rule should be applied to lesser agencies.”164
The bribery language quite nicely encapsulates Hobbs Act crimes, espe-
cially as the government uses the Act today.165 We therefore have a clear
congressional statement that in the face of such crimes, the general con-
spiracy statute would apply. With respect to the Hobbs Act, Congress
decided to increase the penalty. But there is little reason to think it also
intended to abandon the requirements of proving a § 371 conspiracy.166
The most serious charge that one can level against this story is the
fact that some statutes still mention overt act requirements while others
do not.167 Although the Supreme Court certainly found this fact disposi-
161 H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, supra note 156. R
162 See id. at A84 (“The provisions of section 1424 of title 42, U. S. C., 1940 ed., The
Public Health and Welfare, relating to conspiracy were omitted as inconsistent with the general
conspiracy statute, section 371 of this title, both as to punishment and allegation and proof of
an overt act.”).
163 Id. at A42. This Essay argues that there is no sound reason for differentiating between
any conspiracy and the requirement to prove an overt act.
164 Id. (emphasis added).
165 See supra discussion accompanying note 11. R
166 See also supra discussion accompanying notes 116–18. R
167 The Government’s Opposition Brief points to 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (“conspiracy to
kidnap”); 18 U.S.C. § 1511(a)(1) (“conspiracy to obstruct enforcement of criminal laws with
the intent to facilitate illegal gambling”); and 18 U.S.C. § 2153(b) (“conspiracy to obstruct
national defense activities”). Government’s Opposition Brief, supra note 15, at 8. It further R
argues that the “inclusion of overt-act requirements in those statutes indicates that Congress
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tive in Whitfield,168 the legislative history recounted above has enough
force to call this proposition into doubt, at least when it comes to the
Hobbs Act. At the time Congress passed that statute, the record suggests
it took for granted that an overt act was a necessary piece of the puzzle.
So it was, too, with the Supreme Court when it decided Bayer in 1947.169
Again, nowhere in explaining why it specifically delineated conspiracies
in certain crimes did Congress express a desire to eliminate § 371’s overt
act requirement.170 It would make sense, given the higher stakes and the
attendant absurd result, to expect some sort of affirmative statement,
even a hint or an implication, that Congress intended this to be the case.
Instead, the signs point the other way.171
CONCLUSION
Whether an overt act is an element of a Hobbs Act conspiracy has
long divided the circuits. This Essay has argued that the Act does require
proof of an overt act. It bases this on several factors: a reading of the
statutory text that rejects an absurd result, an examination of legislative
history, and an overarching presumption that Congress does not frivo-
lously and incoherently redefine conspiracy. This is certainly contesta-
ble; the Supreme Court’s recent overt act jurisprudence suggests it may
look with some skepticism on these claims.
In a sense, the conventional approach to statutory interpretation is
backwards in this realm. Rather than presume that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, Congress has legislated against the common
law, courts should presume Congress has legislated against its own defi-
nition of conspiracies in § 371. Once Congress has adopted a definition,
it should take a clear congressional statement to the contrary to defeat the
presumption that Congress is using its own definition. Ultimately, the
Court should view the “or conspires” formulation with the healthy skep-
ticism toward broad conspiracy statutes that some of its past members
states its intent expressly when it seeks to deviate from the common law meaning of a conspir-
acy offense.” Id.
168 See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (noting Congress has demon-
strated its ability to add the overt act requirement when it wants to).
169 See supra note 23 and the accompanying discussion. R
170 See H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A29.
171 For this reason, the Court’s recent remarks on the rule of lenity show that it is incom-
patible with this Essay’s arguments. The “rule applies only when a criminal statute contains a
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty, and only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived, the Court can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Ocasio v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 138–39 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The legislative history provides much
more than a mere guess about what Congress intended.
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have shown.172 And indeed, as noted above, although the Court has not
been consistent here, neither has the government.173
The Court declined to hear the Salahuddin case, but it will surely
have the opportunity again someday. After all, the Court has recently
shown significant interest in the Act. In 2016, it vacated the sentence of
former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, significantly narrowing the
scope of what is an “official act.”174
More dramatically, in another recent case, Ocasio,175 the Court
compounded the incoherence this Essay has identified. The defendant
was charged under both § 371 and the Hobbs Act.176 The Court ex-
plained that all that is necessary for a Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction is
that “each conspirator must have specifically intended that some conspir-
ator commit each element of the substantive offense.”177 Yet the Court
further noted, in a footnote attached to that very sentence, that § 371
“also requires that one of the conspirators commit an overt act in further-
ance of the offense. Petitioner does not dispute that this element was
satisfied.”178 It is difficult to see how the Court was not tacitly
backpedaling on the connection to § 371.
Perhaps, then, the Court has already opened the door. In any event,
hopefully the Court does decide to address the unpalatable result this
Essay has identified. Why Congress would require an overt act for lesser
offenses with more lenient sentences and not require one for more seri-
ous offenses when more is on the line is, frankly, baffling. A cleaner rule
would afford all defendants the protection of an overt act requirement.
The Hobbs Act is a good place to start.
172 See supra discussion accompanying notes 46–49. This is true also in the mens rea R
context. Without the right mens rea requirement, Hughes argues, “swaths of benign political
activity would be criminal. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
anti-corruption laws should be narrowly construed.” Hughes, supra note 11, at 26. It seems R
reasonable to extend this reasoning to finding overt act requirements in an anti-corruption law
like the Hobbs Act.
173 See supra notes 69–71 and the accompanying discussion (showcasing the govern- R
ment’s inconsistent position on the overt act in prosecuting Hobbs Act cases).
174 See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
175 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423.
176 Id. at 1427.
177 Id. at 1432.
178 Id. at 1432 n.5.
